Worst diplomatic failing provides chance for diplomacy masterclass

Analysis: Do mention the war. NZ’s military contribution to the Korean War, “when New Zealanders fought for the freedom of the Korean people,” forged relationships on the south end of the peninsula.
But don’t mention the sexual assault case. Don’t mention the cancelled ferries. Don’t mention the CPTPP. And don’t mention intelligence gathering unless it’s artificial intelligence. Certain topics were seemingly off-limits in talks between Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol this week.
Never more clearly has it been demonstrated that diplomacy is the art of discretion, forging a robust relationship through politely disregarding the elephant(s) in the room. This week, Luxon provided a master class.
Somewhat ironically, the opportunity for Luxon to show off his diplomacy was provided, first and foremost, by the worst failing in diplomacy in the two countries’ shared history.
Just days before Luxon arrived in the Korea, Korea’s former consul and deputy ambassador was convicted of repeatedly sexually assaulting a Kiwi staffer at the embassy in Wellington. Hongkon Kim was handed down a suspended prison sentence, and ordered to do community service and undergo counselling.
Speaking through Newsroom, the victim pleaded for the Prime Minister to raise it in talks with the President. “If the Prime Minister cares about justice he will honour the assurances given by previous Prime Ministers,” the victim says. “If he doesn’t, it will show that he is unable to take decisive leadership in the international arena, and he is sending a message to the New Zealand public that he is all talk, but not actually tough on crime.”
Luxon did not. “This was not raised in today’s meeting, however there are regular discussions between officials regarding criminal justice matters,” a spokesperson says.
And that was quite likely the right call. When Jacinda Ardern raised the case without advance warning in talks with the previous president in 2020, it provoked a diplomatic crisis. The New Zealand Embassy in Seoul was forced to frantically distance itself, portraying her as having gone rogue.
The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs even apologised for its handling of the case – but only to the Korean people for causing embarrassment, not to New Zealand or to Kim’s victim.
Moreover, the same day that Luxon met President Yoon at the Yongsan Presidential Office in Seoul, prosecutors filed appeal papers seeking a tougher sentence for Kim, to ensure he actually sees the inside of a prison cell.
The matter remains an active court case; if it’s inappropriate for Luxon to comment on a court judgment at home in New Zealand, it’s similarly inappropriate (albeit for different constitutional reasons) when he’s overseas.
In a joint statement from Luxon and Yoon, there was no mention of the cancellation of the Kiwirail contract to build two new ferries – which the Maritime Union says will cost $1 billion in lost deposits and break fees. New Zealand officials notified their South Korean counterparts of the termination via text message less than an hour before it was to be announced.
That was despite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade earlier warning of the risk to New Zealand’s relationship with South Korea and the need for “careful and deliberate communications” with its government.
Nor was there any mention of intelligence gathering, after a New York grand jury indicted former US Central Intelligence Agency analyst Sue Mi Terry on charges of acting as a spy for the South Korean government in exchange for luxury goods, bags and fancy meals.
But perhaps most notably, there was no mention of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Pacific rim deal created under the oversight of New Zealand trade negotiators.
Korea has blown hot and cold about applying for membership but, since presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden both poured cold water on the US joining, Korea has blown more cold than hot.
After their meeting, Luxon and Yoon talked up a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership recognising “the close ties that stem from more than 60 years of diplomatic relations”, and revealed plans to upgrade the two countries’ bilateral free trade deal.
That upgrade will be welcomed by New Zealand goods and services exporters.
Philip Turner, New Zealand’s former ambassador to Seoul, says getting the Korean Government to agree to an upgrade is a sizeable achievement. “The Koreans are really tough negotiators, and they won’t give up something for nothing,” he says. “So I think we should be braced for a tough negotiation, but the fact that they’ve agreed to kick it off with the upgrade is a good start.”
If Korea were to agree to increase quotas on milk powder and mussels, expedite cuts to meet tariffs, and reduce a “shockingly high tariff” on honey, then New Zealand producers would be better off.
But, he says, New Zealand would have stood to gain more from Korea joining the CPTPP – and that’s why it’s disappointing that they’re no longer even discussing it.
“From New Zealand’s point of view it is frustrating that Korea has failed to join, to date,” Turner adds.
“President Yoon himself voiced in-principle support for CPTPP and his predecessor also urged Korea to join. So the fact that two years later, Yoon is not even prepared to mention it in a meeting with New Zealand is a surprise and a disappointment.”
Their sticking points are the fact the US is not interested (“they worry about that a lot”); potential opposition from Japan; and some smaller but significant domestic lobby concerns around the car industry and agriculture. “Korean farmers are always concerned about foreign competition.”
Turner speculates that there was a trade-off – that New Zealand agreed not to insist on a reference to CPTPP, in return for agreement to an upgrade of the bilateral trade deal.
Former New Zealand diplomat and trade negotiator Charles Finny shares Turner’s equivocal assessment. The agreement to explore the upgrade of the the 2015 free trade agreement is welcome but, in due course, it would be good to have Korea in the CPTPP. “It is interesting that this was not an issue included in yesterday’s communique.”
During April and May, a Royal New Zealand Air Force P-8A Poseidon flew 11 missions to detect and deter North Korean ballistic missile launches and Chinese shipping breaches – the first overseas operational deployment for the new P-8A.
RNZAF No 5 Squadron Commanding Officer Wing Commander Mark Whiteside said although patrols were conducted over international waters, being in the vicinity of some of the busiest commercial shipping lanes in the world added complexity to the operations.
“Those seeking to evade the United Nations Security Council sanctions adopt various tactics to try and hide what they are doing,” he said. “Vessels were observed conducting ship-to-ship transfers, potentially of banned goods such as oil and coal – which are key enablers that allow North Korea to continue its weapons programme.”
And in June, Defence Minister Judith Collins announced New Zealand would deploy up to 41 additional personnel to Korea, increasing the size of its contribution to the United Nations Command and its Military Armistice Commission from 12, to up to 53 personnel.
According to Professor David Capie, the director of Victoria University’s Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand has signalled a pretty hefty step up in its engagement on Korean security issues this year – more than doubling the number of Kiwi troops on the peninsula, and deploying a navy ship and P-8 aircraft based out of Japan to enforce United Nations sanctions.
“That’s a significant increase in effort, especially given the fiscal pressures the government is facing at home.”
He argues the Government is especially interested in growing the security relationship with Seoul in the context of the so-called “IP4” Indo-Pacific Partners – Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand – who have met three times since 2022 in a Nato context.
“I think what will be interesting to watch is if that group of four democratic partners, plus the United States, becomes another part of the small group or ‘minilateral’ cooperation that’s increasingly part of the Indo-Pacific security picture.
“My sense is that in less than a year NZ has moved from one of the bigger sceptics on IP4 cooperation to perhaps its biggest champion.”
He says public opinion in South Korea has really soured on China in the past decade, partly because, like Australia, Seoul has been on the end of some pretty sharp economic coercion from Beijing.
But South Korea always needs to balance its wider interests against managing its immediate threat from North Korea. “That means you’re unlikely to see South Korea taking strong positions on, say, the South China Sea because getting Beijing’s support on North Korea issues is so much more pressing.”
All this leaves more questions asked than answered for New Zealand’s current ambassador, Dawn Bennet. Among them, the call from Hongkon Kim’s victim for enhanced cooperation on criminal matters, partly acknowledged by the Prime Minister in promising ongoing liaison between officials with regard to criminal justice matters.
The Kiwi who was assaulted at the Embassy in Wellington says: “I am very grateful that the Korean prosecutors are taking this seriously, where New Zealand failed. I think it shows that New Zealand has a lot to learn from Korea.”
The victim notes that all New Zealand’s police and foreign affairs decision-makers had decided against seeking extradition, because they thought Kim’s offending didn’t cross the bar of criminal law in Korea – even though police believed it did in New Zealand.
They were wrong; seven years after the offending, Kim’s finally been convicted, in Korea.
“I trust that the Prime Minister will ensure  that those people who have sought to cover up their inadequate handling of this matter up in New Zealand will be held to account.”